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The inevitable legal pluralism within
universal harmonization regimes: the
case of the CISG
Paul Schiff Berman*
Abstract
Faced with a world of multiple overlapping normative communities and jurisdictions,
law often seeks universal rules and harmonization regimes. Such rules and regimes offer
to tame pluralism through the imposition of common codes of conduct. The 1980
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) is a useful example
of this phenomenon. Arising from harmonization efforts dating back at least to the
1920s, the CISG purports to solve the problem of jurisdictional overlap and inconsistency
in the application of domestic law to cross-border commercial transactions. To its back-
ers, the CISG addresses intractable problems of legal uncertainty and forum shopping,
creating a stable global law of trade. Thus, the CISG resolutely seeks uniformity, and those
most committed to the treaty and its implementation tend to see any inconsistency in
application as a problem to be solved rather than a necessary feature of how even a
harmonization regime must operate in a multivariate word. This brief article takes the
opposite approach, suggesting some ways in which legal pluralism inevitably creeps into
the CISG regime, and treating such areas of pluralism as a reality that will never (and
perhaps should never) disappear completely.
Introduction
Faced with a world of multiple overlapping normative communities and juris-
dictions, law often seeks universal rules and harmonization regimes. Such rules
and regimes offer to tame pluralism through the imposition of common codes of
conduct. The 1980 Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
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(CISG) is a useful example of this phenomenon.1 Arising from harmonization
efforts dating back at least to the 1920s, the CISG purports to solve the problem of
jurisdictional overlap and inconsistency in the application of domestic law
to cross-border commercial transactions. To its backers, the CISG addresses in-
tractable problems of legal uncertainty and forum shopping, creating a stable
global law of trade. Thus, the CISG resolutely seeks uniformity, and those most
committed to the treaty and its implementation tend to see any inconsistency in
application as a problem to be solved rather than as a necessary feature of
how even a harmonization regime must operate in a multivariate word. This
brief article takes the opposite approach, suggesting some ways in which legal
pluralism inevitably creeps into the CISG regime, and treating such areas of
pluralism as a reality that will never (and perhaps should never) disappear
completely.
Of course, to some degree, the entire project of the CISG is an acknowledgment
of legal pluralism. Indeed, the scheme of developing an overarching transnational
law of commercial trade hearkens back to the mythical idea of a lex mercatoria
that operates independently of formal state law.2 The CISG, like the Uniform
Commercial Code in the USA,3 is meant to codify law as it is already being
practised in day-to-day commercial encounters. These are ‘the unwritten cus-
tomary rules of the trade’ that theorist Gunther Teubner and others have identi-
fied as an independent social system that can sometimes harden into formal law.4
Thus, the CISG is inherently a pluralist instrument, one that recognizes the in-
dependent valence of non-state customary norms and seeks to systematize those
norms into a form of ‘hard law’. However, as we will see, the document is not only
itself the product of pluralism; it inevitably contains pluralism within it.
I. The pluralism within the CISG
The inherent pluralism of the CISG does not simply get codified into an inter-
national law instrument and thereby lose all of its pluralism. For although the
impulse behind the CISG is to harmonize contract law and eliminate pluralism,
diversity inevitably creeps back in. We can observe a number of ways in which this
process of pluralism occurs.
1 UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 1489 UNTS 3 (1980).
2 See, eg, Clayton P Gillette, ‘The Law Merchant in the Modern Age: Institutional Design and
International Usages under the CISG’ (2004) 5 Chicago Journal of International Law 157, 159
(noting that the Convention ‘explicitly incorporates trade usages into contracts that it governs,
permits usages to trump conflicting [Convention] provisions, and authorizes courts to interpret
and complete contracts by reference to usages’). But see Celia Wasserstein Fassberg, ‘Lex
Mercatoria: Hoist with Its Own Petard?’ (2004) 5 Chicago Journal of International Law 67
(arguing that the modern revival of lex mercatoria departs significantly from the historical
conception).
3 See Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, ‘The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules’
(1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 465, 503–19 (describing Karl Llewellyn’s initial drafts of what
later became Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code).
4 Gunther Teubner, ‘The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism‘ (1992) 13 Cardozo Law
Review 1443, 1449.
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1. Interpretation of Article 7(1)
First, we can identify what seems like the most straightforward harmonization
statement in the entire Convention, Article 7(1), which states that ‘in the inter-
pretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its international character and
to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good
faith in international trade’. At first blush, this provision seems to be a strong
harmonization plea, not an avenue for pluralism. The message is clear: do not
advance parochial or divergent local interests at the expense of uniformity.
And yet, even here at its most internationalist, the Convention necessarily per-
mits radically different interpretations of what counts as ‘regard’ for the docu-
ment’s ‘international character’.5 For example, a common law judge, seeking
uniformity, might look immediately to the interpretations of the Convention
previously set forth by other judges based on other factual scenarios. And,
then, like all good common law judges, the judge would analogize and distinguish
those cases in order to seek the best fit and justification for the overall interna-
tional harmony of the doctrine.
In contrast, a civil law judge, faced with the same admonishment, would eschew
looking at judicial opinions and instead give weight to scholarly commentary and
exposition that aims to explain the Convention’s text and shape it into a unified
whole. Thus, faced with a prior court interpretation criticized by scholars, a civil
law judge is likely to embrace the scholarly commentary and discount the judicial
opinion, while the common law judge is likely to do just the reverse. And yet both
judges would be applying the principle of Article 7(1) and acting in the name of
uniformity!
Accordingly, it is clear that, even when participants embrace the Convention’s
universalist aims, the results need not always be uniform. This is no surprise to
socio-legal scholars who, for decades, have charted the myriad ways in which the
law ‘on the books’ does not necessarily match the ‘law in action’ as actually
interpreted and applied in everyday life. As a result, any desire for uniformity is
always likely to be thwarted, at least around the margins.
Ironically, the fact that the CISG allows multiple approaches to uniformity may
be partly responsible for its widespread adoption by different countries. As Vivian
Curran has pointed out, the CISG is both a ‘seamless text that precedes the cases’,
qualifying it as law to the civil law mind, and a law whose uniformity and coher-
ence over time will be created by judicial opinions interpreted pursuant to Article
7(1), just as the common law method expects.6 The CISG therefore appeals to
both civil law and common law mindsets, and this pluralism at the core of the
CISG is undoubtedly a fundamental reason it has been so widely adopted and
used.
5 See Vivian Grosswald Curran, ‘A Comparative Perspective on the CISG’ in Harry M Flechtner et al
(eds), Drafting Contracts under the CISG (Oxford University Press 2008) 49, 50 (pursuing differ-
ences between common and civil law approaches to uniformity).
6 Ibid 60.
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2. Issues excluded from the CISG
A second sphere of pluralism lies in all of the many areas of transnational contract
that are expressly excluded from the CISG. Most importantly, Article 2(a) leaves
the extremely important field of consumer contracts out of the purview of the
CISG altogether. States differ greatly in their efforts to strike the balance between
the rights of vendors and the rights of consumers, particularly at a time when the
rise of boilerplate and contracts of adhesion has put pressure on the traditional
conception of contracts simply as bargained-for exchanges among negotiating
partners.7 At least in the consumer context, unequal power between the parties to
the contract has rendered such contracts more akin to elements of the product
itself, potentially to be governed by tort law and consumer protection legislation
not by contract law. In this significant area, the CISG holds no sway, letting many
pluralist flowers bloom.
The CISG also explicitly excludes questions of contract validity from its pur-
view. Article 4 makes clear that the Convention addresses only contract formation
and the interpretation of rights and obligations under the contract itself.
Accordingly, if a State chooses to adopt a robust law of unconscionability, for
example, that law might be interposed to declare a contract invalid regardless of
the provisions of the CISG. Again, this clause allows for significant pluralism
because of the potential to impose public policy requirements on questions of
whether a valid contract was formed in the first place.
3. Lacunae in the text of the CISG
Third, even with regard to matters generally within the ambit of the Convention,
there are, inevitably, lacunae. Article 7(2) focuses on such lacunae when the
Convention seems to cover a topic but does not expressly provide a rule to resolve
that issue. In an effort to fend off pluralism, Article 7(2) first states that if the
Convention does not expressly settle a ‘question[] concerning [a] matter[] gov-
erned by this Convention,’ then courts are to look to ‘the general principles on
which [the Convention] is based’ to answer the question. In the absence of general
principles, which should be rare, Article 7(2) directs interpreters to ‘the law ap-
plicable by virtue of the rules of private international law,’ which are also known
as conflict-of-law rules.
The classic example of a ‘gap’ within the Convention is Article 78. Article 78
provides that ‘[i]f a party fails to pay the price or any other sum that is in arrears,
the other party is entitled to interest on it’. Here, although the Convention pro-
vides that the other party is entitled to interest, it does not offer any guidance
regarding how the interest is to be calculated.8 And, not surprisingly, courts and
commentators have endlessly debated the matter.
7 For a discussion of these concerns, see generally Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate: The Fine Print,
Vanishing Rights, and the Rule of Law (Princeton University Press 2012).
8 For a discussion of Article 78, its history and application, see Francesco G Mazzotta, ‘CISG Article
78: Endless Disagreement among Commentators, Much Less among the Courts’ <http://www.
cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/mazzotta78.html> accessed 14 July 2015.
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4. Ambiguity in the text of the CISG
A fourth area of pluralism arises where the provisions of the Convention them-
selves are sufficiently ambiguous that they are internally open to interpretation.
Such ambiguities inevitably provide opportunities for judges and arbitrators to
diverge in their application of a given contractual provision. As Paul Stephan has
argued:
[t]he very extent of the convention, as well as the rules applicable to contracts within
its coverage, remains sufficiently unclear to allow decisionmakers to make almost any
choice they wish. Moreover, even when the language of the CISG follows that of
preexisting rules, such as those of Article 2 of the UCC, it still displaces the clarifying
glosses that national courts have given to domestic law.9
These ambiguities are yet another form of gap, and they may be inevitable, given
that the drafters needed to create a document that would satisfy so many signatory
nations. Not surprisingly, differences of opinion were papered over in vague
language that could appeal to all.
The result, however, is not uniformity but, rather, a potential pluralism of
interpretations. Let us try out some concrete examples.10 Assume that a corpor-
ation in one signatory state—say, Germany—enters into a contract with a cor-
poration from another signatory state—say, the USA. Article 1(1)(a) states that
the Convention governs contracts ‘between parties whose places of business are in
different states’, each of which has joined the Convention. Thus, it appears
straightforward that the Convention will apply to this contract. However, what
if the German corporation has a US office that handles all contractual matters
related to US businesses? Does this still count as a German corporation, or will
this contract no longer be governed by the CISG? According to Article 10(a) of the
Convention, if a party has more than one place of business, that ‘which has the
closest relationship to the contract and its performance’ is the one that matters.
But then we have an interpretive question. Is the relevant place of business the US
office of the German corporation, which is where the contract was presumably
negotiated and administered, or is it the German location where, perhaps, the
goods at issue are manufactured or from which they are shipped?
Similarly, we can imagine ambiguities as to whether a given contract primarily
concerns goods, which would make the contract subject to the Convention, or
services, which would not, pursuant to Article 3(2)—for example, if the contract
required the German company not only to sell equipment but also to provide
maintenance, customization of the equipment, and training as to its use. In this
scenario, are the goods or the services the ‘preponderant’ aspect of the contract?
Next, as noted above, the CISG purports to exclude questions of contract val-
idity from its ambit. It is sometimes difficult, however, to separate out a validity
question from a question of the contract’s substantive terms. For example, if a
9 Paul B Stephan, ‘The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in International Commercial Law’
(1999) 39 Virginia Journal of International Law 743, 774.
10 These examples are derived from Paul B Stephan, ibid 774–6.
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contract price is stated in Euros, but a local state law in the USA requires that
contracts must be in dollars, is that a matter of contract validity to be subject to
the local state law or is that merely a pricing term in a contract that the convention
covers?
Finally, there is Article 6, which permits parties to ‘exclude the application of
this Convention or, subject to Article 12, derogate from or vary the effect of any of
its provisions’. This seems to be a straightforward party autonomy principle, but
courts and commentators can vary regarding whether such an exclusion can
occur implicitly or whether instead such an exclusion must be explicit under
the terms of the contract itself.11 Obviously, this difference in interpretation
will result in divergence of the law applicable to the contract.
We could go on and on. Some of these sorts of ambiguities, of course, are
inherent in any attempt to produce a legal code. Human activity is simply too
varied to be fully captured ex ante by a statute. There will always be gray areas that
require subsequent interpretation. Additional ambiguities are inherent in the
vagaries of language, which is often imprecise or subject to double meanings.
And for an international legal instrument, the imprecision of language is multi-
plied by the act of translation. Finally, as noted above, still other ambiguities are
deliberately left in an international convention because negotiators cannot agree
on a definitive meaning or interpretation. However, whatever the reason, it is
clear that such ambiguities cannot simply be wished away in the CISG’s
harmonization effort.
Thus, we see at least four distinct areas where pluralism seeps into the CISG: (1)
areas arguably not within the ambit of the Convention; (2) areas covered by the
Convention but where gaps can be filled based on general principles of the
Convention; (3) areas covered by the Convention, but where gaps are filled by
reference to a local choice-of-law principle; and (4) areas where the provisions of
the Convention themselves are sufficiently ambiguous that they are internally
open to interpretation.
For all of these reasons, it is difficult to deny that legal pluralism is inevitably
present, even in this document that seeks unity and harmonization. This is not in
any respect meant to be a criticism of the Convention or to suggest that anything
incompetent or nefarious took place during the drafting. It is simply to acknow-
ledge that no harmonization scheme ultimately eradicates pluralism entirely.
II. Why legal pluralism within the CISG is neither a surprise nor
a cause for concern
Is all of this pluralism a cause for concern? Interestingly, most proponents of the
CISG seem to think so. Any space for competing interpretations is seen as a
problem to be solved rather than a necessary feature of the system. For example,
one commentator refers to the fact, discussed above, that the same words in a
11 Franco Ferrari, ‘Choice of Forum and CISG: Remarks on the Latter’s Impact on the Former’
(2005–6) 25 Journal of Law and Commerce 103, 141–2 (citing cases).
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uniform convention can be interpreted differently in different countries as a
‘problem [that] cannot be ignored’.12 Likewise, another rejects one possible in-
terpretation of Article 1 as running ‘counter to the spirit of uniformity’ embodied
in the CISG.13 And, of course, we see multiple websites, scholarly commentaries,
and other materials designed to promote the uniformity of interpretation and
application of the CISG.14
One reason that legal pluralism is viewed as a problem is that advocates of har-
monization appear to universally fear the possibility that parties might engage in
forum shopping to find the most advantageous law or Convention interpretation.
But, is forum shopping necessarily such an evil that it provides a sufficient reason,
in and of itself, to choose one jurisdictional scheme over another? Certainly, not
without closer scrutiny. As Larry Kramer has pointed out, ‘[t]he assumption that it
is unfair to allow plaintiffs to [forum-shop] presupposes a “correct” or “fair”
baseline defining how often the plaintiff’s choice ought to prevail’.15
Indeed, if it is legitimate to have different jurisdictional entities applying dis-
tinct bodies of law, why should the law not vary depending on where a suit is
brought and why is it necessarily unfair to give parties this choice? Brainerd
Currie, arguably the most influential American choice-of-law theorist, down-
played the importance of forum shopping, particularly if preventing it required
sacrificing substantive policies.16 And even if one believes forum shopping is a
problem, it is difficult to evaluate this concern without empirical data. For ex-
ample, other factors beyond choices about substantive norms may well have a
strong impact on forum choice. If most parties consult a local attorney, how many
attorneys are willing or able to file suit and litigate in a foreign jurisdiction? How
might the existence (or non-existence) of regular referral arrangements affect this
choice? Thus, on both normative and empirical grounds, there is at least some
cause to question the reflexive concern about excessive forum shopping without
further exploration of the extent of the problem.17
12 Ibid 139.
13 See Michael Bridge, ‘Choice of Law and the CISG: Opting In and Opting Out’ in Flechtner et al (n
5) 65, 68.
14 See Ferrari (n 10) 139 (collecting sources).
15 Larry Kramer, ‘Rethinking Choice of Law’ (1990) 90 Columbia Law Review 277, 313 n 117.
16 See Brainerd Currie, ‘Survival of Actions: Adjudication versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws’
in Brainerd Currie (ed), Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws (Duke University Press 1963)
(suggesting that, at least in some circumstances, forum shopping is ‘positively commendable’
and arguing that ‘we need to take a harder and closer look at the ideal of uniformity and the
condemnation of forum-shopping’). Currie has, of course, been criticized for emphasizing the
policies underlying substantive laws to the exclusion of more general choice-of-law policies, such
as the need to minimize forum shopping and enhance uniformity and predictability. See, eg,
Alfred Hill, ‘Governmental Interest and the Conflict of Laws: A Reply to Professor Currie’
(1960) 27 University of Chicago Law Review 463, 502–7 (criticizing Currie’s approach on the
grounds that it multiplies the number of potential conflict situations and does not provide an
adequate framework for addressing such conflicts); Arthur Taylor von Mehren, ‘Recent Trends in
Choice-of-Law Methodology’ (1975) 60 Cornell Law Review 927, 938 (arguing that Currie’s ap-
proach to multi-state situations is ‘simplistic’).
17 Larry Kramer has argued that assertions of unfairness regarding plaintiffs’ power to shop for a
forum ‘rest[] on an unarticulated—and unexplained—assumption about what each party is
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Alongside the forum-shopping concern is a related concern about legal uncer-
tainty. We are told that parties want certainty regarding the law to be applied and
that any ambiguity therefore increases transaction costs. However, as with forum
shopping, such a concern may not be borne out empirically, at least with regard to
contracts. To begin with, it is not at all clear that parties always value certainty
above all else. Indeed, too much legal certainty decreases flexibility, which many
parties may actually prefer.18 After all, in order to achieve certainty, a legal regime
must provide more and more detailed rules to cover every situation. But the more
such rules that exist, the more likely that the parties will encounter default rules
that they actually wish to modify or avoid, requiring them to spend time and
effort trying to contract around those default rules. This process of modifying
default rules involves the very transaction costs that we are told legal certainty is
meant to avoid.
Moreover, the precise legal regime to be applied to a contract—whether certain
or uncertain—is often essentially irrelevant to the parties in actual practice, and,
therefore, the existence of pluralism is not a significant threat. In his classic study
of form contracts in the business-to-business context, Stewart Macaulay revealed
that such contracts often remain completely unchanged even when intervening
legal developments alter the landscape for such contracts and should have dic-
tated alterations in the contracts themselves.19 According to Macaulay, the parties
rarely resort to litigation to resolve contract disputes anyway and, therefore, rely
upon the relationships and practices built up over an ongoing course of dealing
far more than the precise terms of the contract law as interpreted by the courts. As
Macaulay recounts, ‘[c]ontract planning and contract law, at best, stand at the
margin of important long-term continuing business relations. Business people
often do not plan, exhibit great care in drafting contracts, pay much attention to
those that lawyers carefully draft, or honor a legal approach to business relation-
ships’.20 Instead, Macaulay argues, ‘business cultures’ tend to have more impact
on contractual relations than the precise legal regime being used.
When we look at cases under the Convention, we see similar evidence that the
reality on the ground is less affected by the terms of the Convention than we might
initially assume. Indeed, one study of CISG cases in the USA, France, and
Germany found that many international sales do not even specify the governing
entitled to expect in a “fair” system’. Larry Kramer (n 15) 313–14 n 117. He ‘share[s] the intuition
that it is “unfair” if plaintiffs can always choose among the potentially applicable laws’ but is ‘loath
to rely on an intuition that [he] cannot satisfactorily defend simply because it is widely shared’.
Ibid 314 n 117. Of course, to the extent forum shopping creates uncertainty, parties may attempt to
contract around the problem through forum selection and choice-of-law clauses (at least in con-
tractually based cases), or may contractually choose non-litigation alternatives. These ‘solutions’
depend in part, however, on the law applied to the contractual provisions.
18 See Stephan (n 9) 747.
19 Stewart Macaulay, ‘Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study’ (1963) 28
American Sociological Review 55.
20 Stewart Macaulay, ‘An Empirical View of Contract’ (1985) Wisconsin Law Review 465, 467.
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law to be applied—either the CISG or any other.21 For example, in twenty-four
out of thirty-eight US cases studied, the parties did not provide for the law gov-
erning their contracts, let alone opt in or out of the CISG, and in two other cases
the parties had sent standardized forms or unilaterally provided for the applicable
law without seeking the agreement of the other party on the issue.22 In other
words, in twenty-four out of thirty-eight cases, or 63 per cent, the parties were not
sufficiently concerned with the applicable law to include a provision in this re-
spect or to ensure that it would be enforceable. Likewise, in Germany, in more
than 75 per cent of the cases that discussed the existence of a choice-of-law clause,
the parties did not provide for the applicable law to their contract of sale.23 And in
France, out of twenty-four cases applying the CISG, it appears that parties ser-
iously addressed the issue of the applicable law in only one case.24 Turning to
arbitration, a study of thirty arbitral awards that applied the CISG reveals that the
parties provided for the applicable law in only 60 per cent of the cases.25
Of course, these are small sample sizes, and it may be that so few contracts are
ever litigated that this is an unrepresentative group. However, in some ways that is
the point. If litigation is rare and parties draft their contracts without much
concern for the applicable law, then we should at least question how important
having a fully harmonized regime actually is. Instead, it seems likely that the prior
course of dealing among contracting parties, their cultural expectations, their
sense of shared norms, and so forth are at least as important as the universalist
rules provided by the Convention.
III. The CISG’s influence on the pluralist development of
transnational contract law
None of the preceding discussion should be taken to mean that having a conven-
tion on the international sale of goods is a bad idea or somehow has no effect at all.
But the important impacts of the CISG may arise in different and more subtle
ways than its proponents generally assume. This last section suggests two ways
that the CISG likely shapes the pluralist development of transnational contract
law.
1. The CISG as a potential force for shifting legal consciousness
Law helps to shape norms and expectations over time, and those norms slowly
become part of legal consciousness—the day-to-day sense people have regarding
‘the way things are’. Thus, the rules embodied in the CISG are both derived from
commercial practice and, over time, will inevitably shape commercial culture in
21 See Gilles Cuniberti, ‘Is the CISG Benefitting Anybody?’ (2006) 39 Vanderbilt Journal of
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an endless feedback loop. Accordingly, it may be that the existence of the CISG
will contribute to a harmonization of social practice as people imbibe the expect-
ations codified in the Convention. And courts may, over time, also interpret their
own local contractual regimes with reference to the Convention and its norms,
which also contributes to harmonization over time.
This subtle process of norm development may ultimately be the way in which
the CISG most contributes to harmonization—not by literally enforcing uni-
formity but, rather, by influencing the pluralist development of transnational
contract law. Socio-legal scholars have long argued that law operates as much
by influencing modes of thought as by determining conduct in any specific case.26
It is a constitutive part of culture, shaping and determining social relations27 and
providing ‘a distinctive manner of imagining the real’.28
For example, ‘[l]ong before we ever think about going to a courtroom, we
encounter landlords and tenants, husbands and wives, barkeeps and hotel
guests—roles that already embed a variety of juridical notions’.29 Indeed, we
cannot escape the categories and discourses that law supplies.30 These categories
may include ideas of what is public and what is private, who is an employer and
who is an employee, what precautions are ‘reasonable’, who has ‘rights’, and so
on.31 In short, ‘it is just about impossible to describe any set of “basic” social
26 See, eg, Kristin Bumiller, The Civil Rights Society (Johns Hopkins University Press 1988) 30–2
(examining ‘the role of legal ideology in structuring mass consciousness’); P Ewick and SS Silbey,
The Common Place of Law: Stories from Everyday Life (Newberry Library 1998) 45 (defining ‘legal
consciousness’ and arguing that ‘every time a person interprets some event in terms of legal
concepts or terminology—whether to applaud or to criticize, whether to appropriate or to
resist—legality is produced’ and ‘repeated invocation of the law sustains its capacity to comprise
social relations’); Michael W McCann, Rights at Work: Pay Equity Reform and the Politics of Legal
Mobilization (University of Chicago Press 1994) 7: ‘Legal (or rights) consciousness . . .refers to the
ongoing, dynamic process of constructing one’s understanding of, and relationship to, the social
world through use of legal conventions and discourses’); Sally Engle Merry, Getting Justice and
Getting Even: Legal Consciousness among Working-Class Americans (University of Chicago Press
1990) 5 (arguing that ‘[l]egal consciousness is expressed by the act of going to court as well as by
talk about rights and entitlements’ and that such ‘[c]onsciousness develops through individual
experiences’); Susan S Silbey, ‘Making a Place for Cultural Analyses of Law’ (1992) 17 Law and
Social Inquiry 39, 42 (noting that ‘law contributes to the articulation of meanings and values of
daily life’).
27 See, eg, Silbey (n 26) 41 (arguing that ‘law is a part of the cultural processes that actively contribute
in the composition of social relations’).
28 Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Anthropology (Basic Books 1983) 173.
29 A Sarat and J Simon, ‘Beyond Legal Realism? Cultural Analysis, Cultural Studies, and the Situation
of Legal Scholarship’ (2001) 13 Yale Journal of Law and Humanity 3, 20.
30 Robert W Gordon, ‘Critical Legal Histories’ (1984) 36 Stanford Law Review 57, 105: ‘[I]n actual
historical societies, the law governing social relations—even when never invoked, alluded to, or
even consciously much thought about—has been such a key element in the constitution of pro-
ductive relations that it is difficult to see the value . . . of trying to describe those relations apart
from law.’
31 Indeed, according to Sarat and Kearns: ‘Perhaps the most stunning example of law’s constitutive
powers is the willingness of persons to conceive of themselves as legal subjects, as the kind of beings
the law implies they are—and needs them to be. Legal subjects think of themselves as competent,
self-directing persons who, for example, enter bargained-for exchanges as free and equal agents.’ A
Sarat and TR Kearns, ‘Beyond the Great Divide: Forms of Legal Scholarship and Everyday Life’ in
Austin Sarat and Thomas R Kearns (eds), Law in Everyday Life (University of Michigan Press 1993)
21, 28.
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practices without describing the legal relations among the people involved—legal
relations that don’t simply condition how the people relate to each other but to an
important extent define the constitutive terms of the relationship’.32
Because legal categories and ideas suffuse social life,33 scholars have studied
both how people think about the law and the ways in which largely inchoate ideas
about the law can affect decisions they make.34 Sally Engle Merry observes legal
consciousness in ‘the way people conceive of the “natural” and normal way of
doing things, their habitual patterns of talk and action, and their commonsense
understanding of the world’.35 These understandings are often taken for granted.
This is because legal consciousness may be so much a part of an individual’s
worldview that it is present even when law is seemingly absent from an under-
standing or construction of life events.36 Thus, ‘[w]e are not merely the inert
recipients of law’s external pressures. Rather, we have imbibed law’s images and
meanings so that they seem our own’.37 Law is an often unnoticed, but neverthe-
less crucial, presence in our ideas of what is fair, appropriate, or natural.38
32 Gordon (n 30) 103.
33 See MC Suchman and LB Edelman, ‘Legal Rational Myths: The New Institutionalism and the Law
and Society Tradition’ (1996) 21 Law and Social Inquiry 903, 907: ‘Law and Society scholarship
depicts the law as a culturally and structurally embedded social institution.’
34 Indeed, various authors have explored the legal consciousness of average citizens. See, eg, Bumiller
(n 26); Ewick and Silbey (n 26); Malcom M. Feeley, The Process Is the Punishment: Handling Cases
in a Lower Criminal Court (Russell Sage Foundation 1979); McCann (n 26), Merry (n 26); Barbara
Yngvesson, Virtuous Citizens, Disruptive Subjects: Order and Complaint in a New England Court
(Routledge 1993); P Ewick and SS Silbey, ‘Conformity, Contestation, and Resistance: An Account
of Legal Consciousness’ (1992) 26 New England Law Review 731; Laura Beth Nielsen, ‘Situating
Legal Consciousness: Experiences and Attitudes of Ordinary Citizens about Law and Street
Harassment’ (2000) 34 Law and Society Review 1055; Austin Sarat, ‘“The Law Is All Over”:
Power, Resistance, and the Legal Consciousness of the Welfare Poor’ (1990) 2 Yale Journal of
Law and the Humanities 343; A Sarat and WLF Felstiner, ‘Lawyers and Legal Consciousness: Law
Talk in the Divorce Lawyer’s Office’ (1989) 98 Yale Law Journal 1663.
35 Merry (n 26) 5; see also Gordon (n 30) 101 (arguing that we should ‘treat legal forms as ideologies
and rituals whose “effects”—effects that include people’s ways of sorting out social experience,
giving it meaning, grading it as natural, just, and necessary or as contrived, unjust and subject to
alteration—are in the realm of consciousness’); Sarat and Simon (n 29) 19: ‘Law is part of the
everyday world, contributing powerfully to the apparently “stable, taken-for-granted quality of
that world and to the generally shared sense that as things are, so must they be”’ (quoting Sarat and
Kearns (n 31) 30).
36 See David M Trubeck, ‘Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism’ (1984) 36
Stanford Law Review 575, 604: ‘Law, like other aspects of belief systems, helps to define the role of
an individual in society and the relations with others that make sense’; see also Jean Comaroff,
Body of Power, Spirit of Resistance: The Culture and History of a South African People (University of
Chicago Press 1985) 4–5 (arguing that consciousness is ‘embedded in the practical constitution of
everyday life, part and parcel of the process whereby the subject is constructed by external socio-
cultural forms’).
37 Sarat and Kearns (n 31) 29. See also Gordon (n 30) 109: ‘[T]he power exerted by a legal regime
consists less in the force that it can bring to bear against violators of its rules than in its capacity to
persuade people that the world described in its images and categories is the only attainable world
in which a sane person would want to live.’
38 See Gordon (n 30) 111: ‘In short, the legal forms we use set limits on what we can imagine as
practical options: Our desires and plans tend to be shaped out of the limited stock of forms
available to us: The forms thus condition not just our power to get what we want but what we
want (or think we can get) itself.’ Indeed, scholars have noted that people’s judgments about praise
and blame will often match the corresponding legal categories, even when those people are not
familiar in detail with legal rules and doctrines. See generally Max Gluckman, The Allocation of
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This focus on law in everyday life39 recognizes that people interpret their ex-
periences by drawing on a collaboration of law and other social structures.40
These interpretations may be widely varied and will, of course, depend partly
on social class, prior contacts with the law, and political standing.41 Nevertheless,
legal consciousness constitutes an ongoing interaction between official norms as
embodied in the common sense categories of daily life and each individual’s
participation in the process of constructing legality.42 Accordingly, legal con-
sciousness includes the ways in which individuals themselves deploy, transform,
or subvert official legal understandings and thereby ‘construct’ law on the
ground.43 We all take part in the construction of legal consciousness, even as
we are also inevitably affected by the legal categories of the social structures
around us.
Although a detailed discussion of the legal consciousness literature is beyond
the scope of this article, it seems clear that an international law instrument such as
the CISG provides a mechanism for influencing cognitive categories and beha-
viour over time. And while it is difficult to definitively prove a direct causal link
between a legal conception and an individual’s category of thought, it does not
mean that such processes are not very powerful determinants of how we think.
Accordingly, what it means to enter into a transnational business relationship,
Responsibility (Manchester University Press 1972) 109, 155–8 (collecting essays by multiple au-
thors analyzing similarities between industrialized societies and primitive African tribes in terms
of their legal systems and behavioral patterns).
39 See, eg, A Sarat and T R Kearns, Law in Everyday Life (Michigan University Press 1993).
40 DM Engel and FW Munger, ‘Rights, Remembrance, and the Reconciliation of Difference’ (1996)
30 Law and Society Review 7, 14 (asserting that their ‘study points to the mutuality and insepar-
ability of law, culture, identity and experience’ and that ‘[l]aw is one of the elements that constitute
the categories and routines of everyday life’); Sarat (n 34) 346 (arguing that welfare recipients, for
example, ‘use legal ideas to interpret and make sense of their relationship to the welfare bureau-
cracy even as they refine those ideas by making claims the meaning and moral content of which are
often at variance with dominant understandings’).
41 See, eg, Davina Cooper, ‘Local Government Legal Consciousness in the Shadow of Juridification’
(1995) 22 Journal of Law and Society 506, 510: ‘[L]aw is understood experientially, in ways shaped
by class, education, geography, and occupational positioning.’ C Seron and F Munger, ‘Law and
Inequality: Race, Gender . . . and, of Course, Class’ (1996) 22 Annual Review of Sociology 187, 202
(asserting that ‘[t]he relationship between lawyers and the evolution of . . . the class system[]
should be a prime area for continuing development of theory and research’).
42 ‘Legality’ is defined as those meanings, sources of authority, and cultural practices that are in some
sense legal although not necessarily approved or acknowledged by official law. The concept of
legality offers the opportunity to consider ‘how, where and with what effect law is produced in and
through commonplace social interactions. . . . How do our social roles and statuses, our relation-
ships, our obligations, prerogatives, and responsibilities, our identities, and our behaviors bear the
imprint of law?’ Ewick and Silbey (n 26) 20. See also Sarat and Kearns (n 31) 55: ‘Law is continu-
ously shaped and reshaped by the ways it is used, even as law’s constitutive power constrains
patterns of usage.’
43 See, eg, Austin Sarat, ‘Redirecting Legal Scholarship in Law Schools’ (2000) 12 Yale Journal of Law
and Humanity 129, 140 (reviewing Paul Kahn, The Cultural Study of Law (1999)): ‘Contests over
meaning in courts or communities . . . become occasions for [sociolegal scholars to observe] the
play of power. Meanings that seem natural, or taken-for-granted, are described as hegemonic, but
because the construction of meaning through law is, in fact, typically contested, scholars show the
many ways in which resistance occurs’) (citation omitted). For discussions of these forms of
resistance, see Ewick and Silbey (n 26); Merry (n 26); Yngvesson (n 34).
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how contracts work, what expectations are ‘reasonable,’ and so on will all be
shaped at least partially by the framework the Convention promulgates and in-
culcates. Thus, the Convention may have long-term impacts on the harmoniza-
tion of cultural expectations and cognitive categories. However, this is a very
different type of process from the top-down unification regimes usually envi-
sioned when conventions of this sort are drafted.
2. The CISG as a potential forum for dialogue among multiple
jurisdictions
Harmonization proponents tend to view legal pluralism, jurisdictional overlap,
and hybrid legal spaces as a problem to be solved by stamping it out, rather than as
a reality to be shaped and influenced over time. Indeed, even when jurisdictional
overlap or regulatory interdependence is undeniable, we see what Robert Ahdieh
has termed ‘the standard dualist response’.44 Law seeks to delimit each entity’s
jurisdiction and authority more effectively and thereby eliminate such overlap.
This paradigm of jurisdictional line drawing has been prevalent both in the inter-
national/transnational realm45 and in discussions of federalism,46 as courts and
scholars try to demarcate distinct spheres for state and federal authority. As
Ahdieh notes, ‘[s]uch reactions are hardly surprising. At heart, they reflect
some visceral sense of law’s project as one of categorization, clear definition,
and line-drawing’.47
Yet this single-minded focus on certainty and clarity not only fails to describe a
globalized world of inevitable cross-border jurisdictional overlap but also ignores
the crucial question of whether leaving open space for such overlapping regula-
tory authority might actually be beneficial. Indeed, while jurisdictional overlap is
frequently viewed as a problem because it potentially creates conflicting obliga-
tions and uncertainty, we might also view jurisdictional redundancy as a necessary
adaptive feature of a multivariate, pluralist legal system. The very existence of
44 Robert B Ahdieh, ‘Dialectical Regulation’ (2006) 38 Connecticut Law Review 863, 867.
45 For example, debates in the USA about judicial citation of foreign authority have often centred
around delineating when it is permissible and when impermissible to reference foreign or inter-
national law. See, eg, Melissa A Waters, ‘Creeping Monism: The Judicial Trend toward Interpretive
Incorporation of Human Rights Treaties’ (2007) 107 Columbia Law Review 628. Similarly, the-
ories of jurisdiction and choice of law have long sought to provide a single answer to the question
of which law should apply to a cross-border dispute. Compare Pennoyer v Neff [1877] 95 US 714
(holding that states have complete authority within their territorial boundaries but no authority
outside those boundaries), with Int’l Shoe Co vWashington [1945], 326 US 310, 316 (establishing a
test for determining whether an assertion of personal jurisdiction comports with the due process
clause of the US Constitution on the basis of whether the defendant had sufficient contacts with
the relevant state ‘such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice”’ (quoting Milliken v Meyer [1940] 311 US 457, 463); compare also
Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws § 378(1934): ‘The law of the place of wrong determines
whether a person has sustained a legal injury’ with Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6 cmt.
c (1971) (providing a more flexible inquiry aimed at determining the place with the ‘most sig-
nificant relationship’ to the dispute in question).
46 See Robert A Schapiro, ‘Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism’ (2005) 91 Iowa Law Review
243.
47 Ahdieh (n 44) 867.
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overlapping jurisdictional claims often leads to a nuanced negotiation—either
explicit or implicit—between or among the various communities making those
claims.48 And what is likely to emerge is an amalgam of local and international law
that may aid the development of each.
In focusing on the pluralist opportunities inherent in jurisdictional overlap, I
echo the insights of Robert Cover’s article ‘The Uses of Jurisdictional
Redundancy’.49 Cover analysed American federalism and celebrated the benefits
that accrue from having multiple overlapping jurisdictional assertions. Such
benefits include a greater possibility for error correction, a more robust field
for norm articulation, and a larger space for creative innovation.50 Moreover,
when decision makers are forced to consider the existence of other possible de-
cision makers, they may tend to adopt, over time, a more restrained view of their
own power and come to see themselves as part of a larger tapestry of decision
making in which they are not the only potentially relevant voice. Finally, although
Cover acknowledged that it might seem perverse ‘to seek out a messy and inde-
terminate end to conflicts which may be tied neatly together by a single authori-
tative verdict’, he nevertheless argued that we should ‘embrace’ a system ‘that
permits tensions and conflicts of the social order’ to be played out in the juris-
dictional structure of the system.51 More recently, Judith Resnik has noted the
‘multiple ports of entry’ that a federalist system creates52 and has argued that what
constitutes the appropriate spheres for ‘local’, ‘national’, and ‘international’ regu-
lation and adjudication changes over time and should not be essentialized.53
Building on these principles, we can perhaps identify two different strategies for
responding to legal pluralism. On the one hand, when facing an issue of inter-
systemic complexity, we can seek to bring order by engaging in pre-emption, line
drawing, and delimiting separate spheres of authority. This is what Cover calls a
‘jurispathic’ approach because it necessarily requires the decision maker to anoint
one legal regime as the legitimate authority and decree that all other regimes are
disabled from applying their norms. In doing so, the decision maker ‘kills off’
conflicting interpretations and authorities.54 The contrasting approach is what
48 See Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law beyond Borders (Cambridge
University Press 2012) 236–43.
49 Robert M Cover, ‘The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation’
(1981) 22 William and Mary University Law Review 639.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid 682.
52 See Judith Resnik, ‘Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s
Multiple Ports of Entry’ (2006) 115 Yale Law Journal 1564.
53 See Judith Resnik, ‘Afterword: Federalism’s Options’ (1996) 14 Yale Law and Policy Review 465,
473–4: ‘My point is not only that particular subject matter may go back and forth between state
and federal governance but also that the tradition of allocation itself is one constantly being
reworked; periodically, events prompt the revisiting of state or federal authority, and the lines
move.’
54 See Robert M Cover, ‘The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative’ (1983)
97 Harvard Law Review 4, 53.
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Cover would call ‘jurisgenerative’.55 This pluralist approach seeks modes of ac-
commodation, deference, and hybridity that will allow multiple jurisdictions to
continue to speak to a particular legal problem, without blocking the dialogue
among systems.56 In the context of the CISG, we might look at all of the various
forms of pluralism that were identified previously not as problems but, rather, as
opportunities to foster a dialogue among transnational business norms, state-
based norms, and the norms articulated in the Convention.
To see how this dialogic approach might work, it may be instructive to look at the
way that one common law judge, US Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
navigates the relative domains of state and federal sovereignty. Often, as with inter-
national versus national law, such choices are built on binary decision making and
clear lines of demarcation. Either a case is within state jurisdiction or federal; either
state law or federal law applies, and so on. But Ginsburg tends to favour overlapping
jurisdictional schemes and more deferential accommodation of multiple interests.
In the three cases that follow, she works hard to achieve this sort of pluralist reso-
lution, even when the path for doing so is less than obvious.
The first is Gasperini v Center for Humanities, Inc.57 In this case, the Court
continued a line of cases considering when a federal court hearing a state claim
should apply state or federal law. Ever since the US Supreme Court’s landmark
decision in Erie Railroad v Tompkins, federal courts hearing state claims are
required to apply state substantive law, essentially as if the case were being decided
in a state court.58 But, what happens if applying the state law conflicts with the
rules governing the general operation of federal courts? These are some of the
knotty problems in what has become known as the Erie doctrine.
Gasperini presented a particularly difficult application of the doctrine because
both the state and federal interests at stake were so strong. New York had passed a
tort-reform statute that sought to rein in what were perceived to be excessive jury
awards.59 Under the statute, state appellate courts were empowered to review the
size of jury verdicts and to order new trials whenever the jury’s award ‘deviates
materially from what would be reasonable compensation’.60 Thus, it would seem
that, if such a situation happened to arise in a state law case brought in federal
court, the federal appellate court should, pursuant to Erie and its progeny, apply
the New York law allowing appellate re-examination of the jury verdict. However,
under the Seventh Amendment of the US Constitution, which governs
55 Ibid 11–15.
56 See Judith Resnik, ‘Living Their Legal Commitments: Paideic Communities, Courts, and Robert
Cover (An Essay on Racial Segregation at Bob Jones University, Patrilineal Membership Rules,
Veiling, and Jurisgenerative Practices)’ (2005) 17 Yale Journal of Law and Humanity 17, 25:
‘[Cover] wanted the state’s actors . . . to be uncomfortable in their knowledge of their own
power, respectful of the legitimacy of competing legal systems, and aware of the possibility that
multiple meanings and divergent practices ought sometimes to be tolerated, even if painfully so.’
57 Gasperini v Center for Humanities, Inc [1996] 518 US 415.
58 Erie Railroad Co v Tompkins [1938] 304 US 64.
59 Gasperini v Center for Humanities, Inc [1996] 518 US 423.
60 NY CPLR §5501(c) (McKinney 1995).
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proceedings in federal court but not in state court, ‘the right of trial by jury shall
be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law’.61 This
provision would normally block a federal court from conducting the sort of
review mandated by the New York law. Accordingly, the Supreme Court was
faced with the question of which rule would prevail in a state-law suit brought
in a federal court in New York.
Justice Scalia, in dissent, took the jurispathic path, arguing categorically that
federal courts must follow the Seventh Amendment’s command regardless of
what a New York court would do.62 Thus, the New York law would have no
impact at all in a federal suit of this kind. In contrast, Justice Ginsburg worked
hard to create a Solomonic solution, whereby both New York’s tort-reform inter-
ests and the Seventh Amendment could be accommodated. To do this, Ginsburg
construed the Seventh Amendment’s re-examination clause to apply to federal
appellate courts but not to the traditional power of federal trial judges to grant
new trials notwithstanding a contrary jury verdict.63 Thus, she reasoned that New
York’s law controlling compensation awards for excessiveness or inadequacy
could be given effect, without detriment to the Seventh Amendment, if the
review standard set out in the state statute were applied by the federal trial
court judge, with appellate control of the trial court’s ruling confined to ‘abuse
of discretion’.64 Under this approach, the trial judge could apply state law re-
viewing the jury verdict, thereby retaining this state policy choice in state law cases
tried in federal courts,65 while the Seventh Amendment prohibition on re-
examining jury verdicts would continue to bind the federal appellate court
(absent a flagrant abuse of discretion).66
Whatever one thinks of the soundness of Ginsburg’s historical and jurispru-
dential analysis, what is most significant is the extraordinarily creative way in
which Ginsburg worked to accommodate both state and federal interests. Had the
Court adopted Justice Scalia’s approach, a litigant from outside New York
involved in a state law suit with a New Yorker would be able to avoid the
state’s tort-reform provision simply by filing that case in, or removing that case
to, federal court. On the other hand, had the Court simply applied the state law
without limitations, it would have been ignoring the significant command of the
US Constitution regarding the sanctity of jury verdicts. By splitting the difference,
the Court arguably protected the core of both state and federal interests at stake.
In Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v Allstate Insurance Co.,67 Ginsburg
again sought to vindicate both state and federal interests in an Erie case. This time
61 US Constitution, Amendment VII.





67 Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, PA v Allstate Insurance Co [2010] 559 US 393.
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the question was whether, in a federal court, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, governing class actions, would override another New York state law,
this one aimed at preventing certain kinds of suits from being brought as class
actions. Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion took the jurispathic position that be-
cause the state law addressed class action suits it was necessarily trumped by Rule
23 in cases heard in federal courts.68 Ginsburg, in dissent, chose a more nuanced
reading. She took Scalia to task for ‘relentlessly’ making choices that would over-
ride state law.69 Instead, she pointed out—in true pluralist fashion—that ‘before
undermining state legislation’ the Court should ask whether the federal and state
laws truly conflict.70 Thus, in contrast to the plurality opinion, she ‘would con-
tinue to interpret Federal Rules with awareness of, and sensitivity to, important
state regulatory policies’.71 Taking this approach, she read Rule 23 to dictate only
the procedures for certifying and pursuing a class action claim. In contrast, she
argued, the New York state law addressed what sort of relief could be pursued
through the class mechanism.72 And, as with Gasperini, regardless of whether one
agrees with her particular way of accommodating both federal and state law, there
can be no doubting her passion to pursue an approach to Erie that attempts to
provide maximum space for the effectuation of important state policy judgments.
Ginsburg’s approach to federal pre-emption law seems to suggest the same
impulse towards mutual accommodation and splitting the difference. For ex-
ample, in American Airlines, Inc. v Wolens,73 the question was whether the federal
law deregulating the airline industry pre-empted state consumer fraud and
breach-of-contract claims brought against American Airlines related to changes
the airline made unilaterally and retroactively to its frequent-flyer program. Two
justices argued that federal law pre-empted both the fraud and contract claims,74
while another argued that neither type of claim should be deemed pre-empted.75
Ginsburg, writing for the Court, took the middle ground, holding that federal law
pre-empted the fraud claims but not the contract claims.76 The Airline
Deregulation Act explicitly pre-empted state-imposed regulation ‘relating to
[air carrier] rates, routes, or services,’77 which would include consumer fraud
claims based in state law.78 However, the contract claims, she concluded, were
based not on state regulation but, rather, on claimed breaches of terms agreed
68 Ibid 398–406.
69 Ibid 437 (Ginsburg, J, dissenting).
70 Ibid (Ginsburg, J, dissenting).
71 Ibid (Ginsburg, J, dissenting).
72 Ibid 446–7 (Ginsburg, J, dissenting).
73 American Airlines, In. v Wolens [1995] 513 US 219.
74 Ibid 238 (O’Connor, J, concurring and dissenting).
75 Ibid 235 (Stevens, J, concurring and dissenting).
76 Ibid 222.
77 Ibid 221–2 (quoting 49 USC § 1305(a)(1).
78 Ibid 228.
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upon by the parties themselves. Thus, they could be maintained without running
afoul of the Airline Deregulation Act.79
In each of these cases, we see Ginsburg working mightily to make subtle dis-
tinctions so as to preserve space for both federal and state interests to be vindi-
cated. Indeed, none of the conclusions Ginsburg reached were clearly dictated by
the cases, rules, or statutes she interpreted.80 Thus, they are actually best under-
stood as efforts to maintain a pluralist structure to American federalism, one that
will allow sufficient play in the joints and overlapping jurisdiction so that all
sovereignties are afforded an opportunity to weigh in with policy judgments.
So too it can be for the CISG, with judges (and contracting parties) building an
amalgam of international and local law, through both interpretation and norm
inculcation over time.
IV. Conclusion
When we move beyond the rhetoric and look at the CISG in practice, it strikes me
that what we find is not the top-down unification of diverse local law that we
might first have expected and that some proponents of the CISG assume is the
sole aim of the entire harmonization effort. Instead, we see a document not only
assembled from pluralist civil and common law influences but also one that is itself
inevitably subject to pluralist influences. First, even the Convention’s unifying
language can be interpreted in different ways based on different linguistic and
legal contexts. Second, there are many important areas of transnational contract
law deliberately excluded from the CISG and thereby left subject to multiple
regulatory regimes. Third, even in areas covered by the Convention, the very
text of the document builds in lacunae where local legal traditions or conflict-
of-laws principles will fill the void. Fourth, the language of the Convention in-
evitably contains ambiguities that are subject to multiple interpretations. And, of
course, we know that in many cases parties will often rely more on their various
business contexts and cultures and less on the unifying vision of international law.
However, all this pluralism does not mean the CISG is flawed or a failure. It just
means that we need to recognize the inevitable pluralism within universal har-
monization schemes. And if we want to move towards a set of more broadly held
norms, we need to understand that such change will come gradually, through
shifts in legal consciousness over time and through nuanced interpretation that
seeks to knit together local and international norms into a new combination that
builds pluralism into the fabric of the regime. In the end, pluralism may provide a
more durable framework for evaluating the long-term efficacy of an international
legal instrument than the false hope of imposed universality.
79 Ibid 228–9.
80 See, eg, Richard D Freer, ‘Some Thoughts on the State of Erie After Gasperini’ (1998) 76 Texas Law
Review 1637 (criticizing the decision).
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